
Engaging Carl Schmitt’s oeuvre is an extremely challenging process. A legal theorist and constitutional lawyer, Schmitt was considered the “crown jurist” of Nazi Germany. After the fall of the Third Reich, Schmitt was held for some time by the Allies, but no charges were ultimately brought against him for his major role in Hitler’s twisted judicial system. During the post-war period, the man was alternatively unapologetic or in denial about his involvement with the 20th century’s most despicable and dangerous ideology.
In Political Theology (henceforth PT), Schmitt provocatively and famously argues that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception [Soverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet].” In other words, it is a true emergency or exception to the status quo of a state which really designates the sovereign, and it is the sovereign who decides whether the emergency is a true exception - and, if so, what steps need to be taken to restore order. Moreover, Schmitt asserts that the sovereign—despite having the power to transcend the constitution’s abstract “limits”—is nevertheless an integral part of the legal order precisely because s/he has the power to suspend the law to secure the state.
Based on these premises, Schmitt goes on to put forth a powerful critique of constitutional liberalism. The liberal constitution’s fundamental drive, Schmitt argues, is to unveil a law so complete that it may provide norms for responding to every possible situation. Schmitt believes that despite this effort, contingencies and contradictions always arise that ultimately undermine this drive and that the exception shows that the state precedes the law because it allows the sovereign to roll back constitutional rights to protect the state against existential threats.
In contradistinction, liberal theory asserts that all is law or, alternatively, that the state and its sovereign merely exist to serve as guardians of the legal process, not to decide on legal questions. (Thomas Paine: “In America, the LAW is king!”) Schmitt refutes this position by referring to the concept of legal form. He argues that the legal form is incapable of translating itself into social reality or consensus without the state and its sovereign: “A point of ascription is not achieved with the aid of the norm; it happens the other way around. A point of ascription first determines what a norm is and what normative rightness is.” It is the very person of the sovereign that transforms an abstract law into a norm by making a decision in the true sense of the term. Schmitt’s vision of “decisionism” and his intellectual affinity with Hobbes is based on this fundamental process.
In The Concept of the Political (henceforth CP), Schmitt offers another one of his (in)famous definitions: all politics is based on a simple distinction between friend and enemy, on a peoples affinity for or enmity against another people. Furthermore, Schmitt characterizes the friend-enemy division to be driven by existential threats to a people’s security, that is, by matters that involve the “life or death” of a nation. For Schmitt, every other category or association (religion, economics, culture, etc.) is social in nature. In order for the category of the political to operate, affinity for the friend and hatred for the enemy must be in play.
Underlying Schmitt’s discourse are the influence of two major sources of inspiration: (1) the realist tradition in political philosophy that reaches all the way back to Machiavelli, includes Hegel-Marx-Lenin, but finds its most systematic expression in the work of Hobbes and (2) conservative Catholic philosophers like Donoso Cortes and de Maistre who viewed dictatorship as the only form of government capable of protecting society against the “sinfulness” of human nature. Schmitt’s intellectual influences may initially seem politically contradictory, but they share a common vision of society as a site of permanent conflict between competing human classes and forces. What Schmitt admires in both sources is their willingness to come terms with the problematic cores of human societies.
In fact, Schmitt, whose own personal politics were deeply reactionary, had a profound respect for the revolutionary left. After all, Marxists and other revolutionaries fully acknowledge their enmity towards the ruling class (”the class enemy”). There is clarity in the opposition between revolution and reaction. There is something compelling about Schmitt’s analysis here that has attracted many thinkers from the new left willing to separate the reactionary content of Schmitt’s thought from its formal structure, which they turn to renew their own lost project.
Liberal thinkers, on the other hand, detest Schmitt - and, as you can imagine, Schmitt is far less generous when approaching liberal politics.
(To be continued…)