Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism originates in his “anthropological” assumptions about human nature and human societies. As I described in Part I, Schmitt is indebted to not only the realist strand in political philosophy (he names Machiavelli, Hobbes, and, interestingly, Hegel and Marx as major proponents of realism), but also to the reactionary Catholic theorists like Donoso Cortes, for whom humanity is inherently evil, ignorant, destructive, and - above all - sinful in nature. Both the realists and the Catholic reactionaries describe the human world as a site of conflict between classes and peoples and as divided against itself and hence contradictory.
For Schmitt, the law is consequently always-already political - that is, it must contend with the possibility that these “internal contradictions” (to use a Marxian term) may become so heightened as to reach the point whereby “sociology” overpowers jurisprudence (PT) and thus threatens the state itself. Nations (and their sovereigns) must operate on a political basis as well - that is, they must remain aware of the presence of the enemy: “Political thought and political instinct prove themselves theoretically and practically in the ability to distinguish friend and enemy,” he writes. “The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy” (CP).
Schmitt characterizes liberalism as a political doctrine and movement based on a fundamental denial of these realities. Liberalism seeks to either depoliticize essentially political oppositions between classes and peoples, or else to neutralize political oppositions by referring to apolitical categories such as economics, morality, culture, and especially the law in order to make political gains on its own behalf:
The worst confusion arises when concepts such as justice and freedom are used to legitimize one’s own political ambitious and to disqualify or demoralize the enemy. In the shadow of an embracing political decision and in the security of a stable political state organization, law, whether private or public, has its own relatively independent domain. As with every other domain of human endeavor and thought, it can be utilize to support or refute other domains. But it is necessary to pay attention to the political meaning of such utilizations of law and morality, and above all the word rule or sovereignty of law… There always are concrete human groupings which fight other concrete human groupings in the name justice, humanity, order, or peace. When being reproached for cynicism, the spectator of political phenomena can always recognize in such reproaches a political weapon used in actual combat (CP).
As a political discourse liberalism negates politics, and fails to advance a systematic vision of state or governance: according to Schmitt, liberalism (like other individualistic ideologies), is singularly devoted to mediating the relationship between the individual and the state (or other institutions that can potentially restrict civil liberties). The sole role of the liberal state is to ensure the individual freedoms and social wellbeing of its citizenry.
Schmitt’s affinity for revolutionaries like Marx and Lenin - in spite of his political opposition to the Marxist project - is to be understood in light of their shared distrust of liberalism’s distortion and negation of politics, as well as its inability to propose “a political principle or an intellectually consistent idea.”
(To be continued…)
5 Comments
April 24, 2008 at 12:34 am
As a point of historical (or historiographical) clarification, I would be interested to know whether a purely liberal movement (divorced from nationalism, constitutionalism, republicanism, etc.) exists for Schmitt to respond to. I suppose that modern-day libertarians advance a political philosophy that embodies this ideal. Many libertarians are expressly unconcerned with the moral implications of particular individual choices (marijuana-using, pro-peace libertarians will advocate for the right to private gun ownership); rather, their sole objective is to modify the level of state intervention with those choices.
However, it is worth noting that such apparent liberalism may be a guise for a more robust political philosophy. I have never met any libertarians who don’t have concurrent views as to the level of government that should remain in order to facilitate the protection of private property interests. If there exists a movement of persons who are exclusively concerned with removing issues from the sphere of political or governmental influence, they would probably be better characterized as anarchists than liberals.
Observing the limited scope of “liberalism” in the absence of the other doctrines advanced by its supporters strikes me as an argument that is based more on semantics than on theoretical criticism.
April 24, 2008 at 2:26 am
First, let me make a quick note about anarchism: in CP, Schmitt discusses anarchists, along with small romantic sects, etc., as exemplifying the antipode to his own assumptions about human nature: because anarchists are so optimistic about human nature, they believe that there is no need for the state or the sovereign. Of course, liberals are clearly not as naive.
I think what Schmitt feels is missing from the liberal ideal as manifested in its panoply of forms is a positive description of the role of the state beyond its capacity to (1) limit its own power through checks and balances and (2) function as guarantor of individual rights against government power.
In contrast, a communist state embodies the will of the revolutionary proletariat against its enemy (the bourgeoisie); a fascist state represents the interests of tradition/race/church against their enemies (”world Jewry” or what have you.)
As one of the purest forms of individualistic liberalism, libertarianism’s minimal state is perhaps most devoid of positive content. Who would sacrifice his life for a libertarian community? On the other hand, how many would sacrifice their lives for [racial or ethno-sectarian purity/the communist utopia/safeguarding the church/...]?
Now, let me declare one thing before I go further or post part III because I don’t want to give the impression that I’m a “Schmittian” or whatever: I think Schmitt’s thought needs to be critically interrogated on many counts. I personally feel that it’s not easy to dismiss the fact that the man was a Nazi lawyer and just admire the structure of his particular brand of jurisprudence. On the contrary, I think that the two (form and content) are closely linked.
At the same time, I feel that liberals like us need to take his contributions and criticisms into account.
April 24, 2008 at 2:52 am
Both of these posts have brought up interesting and relevant positions.. I don’t mean to be unduly argumentative. I guess I just find criticism to be a useful way to analyze and clarify the issues. Working with ideology in the abstract, it can be difficult for me to contextualize the implications of a doctrine unless I try to respond to it critically.
Anyway, you’ve done a good job of responding to my questions in proxy for Schmitt.
April 24, 2008 at 4:48 pm
“I guess I just find criticism to be a useful way to analyze and clarify the issues. Working with ideology in the abstract, it can be difficult for me to contextualize the implications of a doctrine unless I try to respond to it critically.”
Agreed.
May 1, 2008 at 3:50 pm
[...] more diversion before returning to my series on Carl Schmitt. With all due respect to her courageous, decades-long efforts as an attorney and [...]
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